The multifaceted nature of the principle of legal certainty
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.15334429Keywords:
legal certainty, certainty, clarity, quality of the lawAbstract
The article examines the principle of legal certainty as a fundamental component of the rule of law. It is noted that in legal literature, this principle is traditionally understood as a guarantee of the stability of the legal system, ensuring the predictability and clarity of legal norms. Special attention is given to the substantive and procedural requirements arising from this principle: accessibility, clarity, and comprehensibility of legal norms, the prohibition of retroactive laws, the finality of court decisions (res judicata), the stability of legal regulation, and the protection of legitimate expectations. The significance of the practice of the European Court of Human Rights is explored, particularly the rulings in cases such as Sunday Times v. United Kingdom, Olsson v. Sweden, Novik v. Ukraine, and others, where key guidelines were formulated regarding the quality of laws, predictability, and legal certainty.
The work also analyzes the relationship between legal certainty and legal uncertainty, emphasizing the natural presence of the latter in legal systems, which does not exclude the need to adhere to high standards of legal regulation. Special attention is paid to the position of the Venice Commission, which, in its 2009 report, identified legal certainty as one of the fundamental elements of the rule of law. The author emphasizes that this principle is an essential condition for effective lawmaking and law enforcement activities, especially in the context of democratic governance, the protection of human rights, and the functioning of the economy. It is noted that legal uncertainty is a natural element of the system but should not undermine the requirements for stable and high-quality legal regulation. The structural elements of the principle are highlighted, along with its procedural and substantive requirements, including the obligation to publish acts, the stability of legal norms, and the predictability of the consequences of legal application. The conclusion is made about the need for a broad understanding of the principle of legal certainty as a fundamental condition for the functioning of a democratic state and the legal system as a whole. A conclusion is also drawn about the necessity of a comprehensive approach to understanding legal certainty as a systemic phenomenon, which encompasses not only formal legal requirements but also the general conditions for a just and stable legal order.
