Effectiveness of Ukraine’s Anti-Corruption Bodies: Administrative and Legal Analysis of Their Activities and Interaction

Abstract

The article presents a comprehensive administrative and legal analysis of the activities of Ukraine’s anti-corruption bodies – the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine (NABU), the National Agency on Corruption Prevention (NACP), the Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office (SAPO), the High Anti-Corruption Court (HACC), as well as the Prosecutor General’s Office, which acts as a coordinating element within the anti-corruption framework. The relevance of the study is determined by the systemic nature of corruption in Ukraine, its negative impact on the efficiency of public administration, the level of trust in government institutions, and the fulfillment of international obligations to the European Union.

Despite the establishment of specialized anti-corruption institutions, the effectiveness of their work remains a subject of active debate in both academic and practical circles. The Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office plays a key role as a procedural coordinator between NABU investigators and HACC judges, while the Prosecutor General’s Office exercises overall supervision of legality in corruption-related proceedings. At the same time, the absence of a unified model of interaction among these bodies, vague legal regulation of information exchange procedures, contradictions in subordination, and dual accountability hinder the achievement of the expected level of anti-corruption effectiveness.

The purpose of the study is to analyze the administrative and legal nature and powers of anti-corruption institutions, to identify problems of coordination among them, and to formulate recommendations aimed at improving the effectiveness of their functioning. The methodological basis of the study includes formal legal, systemic, comparative legal, and functional approaches.

The article explores the legal foundations of the anti-corruption system, characterizes the administrative mechanisms of interaction between NABU, NACP, SAPO, HACC, and the Prosecutor’s Office, and analyzes the practical implementation of their powers in the field of combating corruption. It is established that the effectiveness of the system largely depends not only on legal regulations but also on institutional coherence, the availability of effective public oversight, and procedural transparency. Typical problems are highlighted, including formalism in investigative approaches, weaknesses in the electronic declaration system, delays in judicial proceedings, and the lack of liability for failure to comply with court rulings or NACP directives.

Based on the study's results, the necessity of revising the legal framework governing cooperation between anti-corruption agencies and the Prosecutor’s Office is substantiated. The paper also proposes improving monitoring and reporting mechanisms and introducing administrative liability for ignoring instructions from supervisory institutions. It is emphasized that the effectiveness of anti-corruption policy must be based on legal certainty, functional autonomy of institutions, and proper coordination, in which the Prosecutor’s Office continues to play a vital role.