Institutional Resilience of the Parliament, Government, and Judiciary of Ukraine under Martial Law: Adaptation, Risks, and Prospects

Abstract

This article analyses how Ukraine’s Parliament, Government, and judiciary have sustained governance under martial law (2022–2025). Russia’s full-scale invasion created an existential shock that typically expands executive discretion; the key question is whether core democratic procedures remain intact. The study combines institutional and neo-institutional perspectives with resilient democracy and emergency powers scholarship.

The analysis focuses on adaptive mechanisms that ensured continuity of decision-making, oversight, and adjudication, while also mapping risks of power concentration and the long-run ‘normalization of exception’. Empirically, it draws on international assessments (Freedom House, Worldwide Governance Indicators, SIGMA, CEPEJ), national legislation, and documented institutional practices. The findings support the argument that Ukraine exhibits an adaptive wartime democracy: functional centralization has increased, but the basic separation-of-powers architecture has not been dismantled.

The contribution is twofold: it conceptualizes Ukraine’s wartime governance as a case of institutional resilience in a democratic setting and identifies structural ‘tension zones’ that may shape post-war institutional rebalancing.