Countering Russian disinformation in Ukraine in the context of the Russia–Ukraine war: The role of state institutions and civil society initiatives

Abstract

The Russia–Ukraine war has shown that disinformation is a systemic element of Russia’s hybrid aggression. It is used to undermine political stability, demoralize society, discredit international support for Ukraine, and delegitimize state decisions. In Ukraine, information attacks are combined with cyberattacks, diplomatic campaigns, and psychological pressure. This complicates detection and neutralization. It also requires treating counter-disinformation as a component of national security. The aim of this study is to provide a comprehensive analysis of Ukraine’s model for countering Russian disinformation in the context of the Russia–Ukraine war. The focus is on the roles of state institutions and civil society initiatives. The study also identifies key challenges and directions for further development.

The study employs the following methods: analysis of legal and regulatory acts and state policies in the field of information security; comparative legal analysis (comparing institutional functions and mandates across different response domains); an institutional and systems approach (treating counter-disinformation as an interconnected ecosystem of state and civil society actors); content analysis of reports, official communications, and analytical materials produced by key institutions and civil society organizations; and synthesis.

The scientific novelty of the study lies in conceptualizing countering Russian disinformation not as a set of fragmented measures, but as a multi-level institutional model. The paper specifies the functional division of roles between the state and civil society sectors. It also identifies critical interaction bottlenecks. These include crisis-time synchronization of communications, alignment of cyber and communication response, and the measurability of outcomes.

As a result, the paper analyzes a counter-disinformation model that integrates strategic coordination within the national security sector, the communication infrastructure of information resilience, foreign-policy communications, counterintelligence and law-enforcement components, cyber response, and media regulation. The study also outlines the contribution of civil society. This includes monitoring, fact-checking, narrative analysis, crisis communication platforms, and media literacy.

In conclusion, the study demonstrates that the effectiveness of Ukraine’s system for countering Russian disinformation depends not on the number of institutions, but on the quality of their interaction. Key factors include synchronized roles and messages during crises, proactive action, alignment of communication and technical response, and institutionalized partnership between the state and civil society without losing independence and trust.