Presumption of innocence as a safeguard against abuse under conditions of procedural economy and optimization of pre-trial investigation

Abstract

In this article, the author examines the specifics of implementing the principle of the presumption of innocence in the context of optimizing the pre-trial investigation. The author reveals the presumption of innocence not only as a fundamental principle of law but also as a multifaceted guarantee of due process, which has an imperative character at all stages of criminal proceedings.

The research was conducted using dialectical, comparative-legal, and formal-legal methods, as well as the methods of analysis and synthesis.

The paper analyzes the relationship between the presumption of innocence and the efficiency of the pre-trial investigation and substantiates the existence of a conflict between the state's desire for a swift conclusion to criminal proceedings and the need to adhere to high standards of proof.

The author details how accelerating criminal proceedings conflicts with the general principles provided for in the Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine, creating a risk of substituting substantive standards of justice with formal indicators of speed. Based on an analysis of the case law of the European Court of Human Rights and the Constitutional Court of Ukraine, it is proven that the presumption of innocence acts as an effective safeguard against accusatory bias and premature conclusions regarding a person's guilt.

By examining the practice of the Supreme Court and doctrinal approaches to defining efficiency criteria, it is established that the need to ensure speed, procedural economy, and openness directly conflicts with the principle of the presumption of innocence.

Based on the research, it is concluded that in the context of modern trends, the presumption of innocence should be viewed as an effective safeguard against abuse, one that prevents tools of procedural economy from undermining standards of proof and an individual's right to a fair trial.