EDIP and the Institutionalization of the EU’s Defence-Industrial Shift: From Crisis Response Instruments to a Policy of Protracted Confrontation with Russia (2025–2027)

Abstract

The article examines the European Defence Industry Programme (EDIP) as a mechanism for the institutional consolidation of the European Union’s defence-industrial shift under conditions of prolonged confrontation with the Russian Federation. The relevance of the topic is determined by the EU’s transition from situational crisis response in 2022–2024 to a more stable programmatic framework for defence-industrial mobilisation in 2025–2027. The purpose of the article is to determine whether EDIP is merely a continuation of the emergency instruments ASAP and EDIRPA, or whether it marks a transition toward a more structured model of EU defence-industrial governance. The methodological framework combines a neo-institutional approach, normative-institutional analysis of EU legal and policy documents, qualitative content analysis, and selected elements of process tracing. This approach makes it possible to reconstruct the sequence of decisions that led to EDIP and to assess whether the programme creates preconditions for longer-term institutionalisation. The article demonstrates that the significance of EDIP lies not so much in the scale of its funding as in its rule-shaping effect. The programme defines access conditions, stimulates cooperation, prioritises the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base, introduces coordination procedures, and creates a separate channel for Ukraine’s involvement. Particular attention is paid to EDIP’s relationship with ASAP and EDIRPA, as well as with broader mechanisms such as PESCO and the European Defence Fund. The article shows that EDIP does not replace these formats but builds upon them, combining crisis-response support with a more stable architecture of defence-industrial governance. The qualitative distinction of EDIP lies in the combination of financial incentives, normative requirements, procedural coordination, and the Ukrainian component. This configuration provides grounds for considering the programme an early form of institutionalisation of EU defence-industrial policy. At the same time, EDIP does not guarantee completed institutionalisation. Its effectiveness will depend on the scaling of resources, the reduction of external dependencies, the depth of cooperation, and the political unity of the member states. The article contributes to the debate by clarifying the criteria that distinguish EDIP from temporary emergency instruments and allow it to be viewed as part of the EU’s structural adaptation to a protracted security crisis. Thus, EDIP appears not only as a response to Russia’s war against Ukraine, but also as an institutional manifestation of the confrontational trajectory in EU–Russia relations.