Designing Institutional Mechanisms for the Distribution of Power to Prevent Conflict Recurrence in Post-Conflict Transitional Societies

Abstract

In the contemporary context of post-conflict development in transitional societies, the issue of preventing conflict recurrence is becoming increasingly relevant due to institutional instability, asymmetry of power distribution, and the insufficient effectiveness of checks and balances mechanisms. The growing risk of renewed conflict escalation is associated not only with political factors but also with systemic dysfunctions within the structure of public governance, which necessitates a scientifically grounded approach to designing institutional mechanisms for the distribution of power. In this regard, there is a need to reconsider classical models of separation of powers, taking into account the specific features of transitional societies.

The рurpose of the article is to substantiate the conceptual foundations and to develop a model of institutional mechanisms for the distribution of power aimed at preventing conflict recurrence in post-conflict transitional societies. The methodological framework of the study is based on the systemic approach, institutional analysis, comparative method, and conceptual modeling, which enables the integration of multi-level elements of power interaction into a coherent analytical framework.

The study identifies key institutional vulnerabilities that act as triggers of conflict recurrence, including excessive centralization of power, limited independence of the judiciary, imbalances between central and regional authorities, and the formalization of control mechanisms. On this basis, a conceptual model of power distribution is proposed, combining horizontal and vertical balancing mechanisms and incorporating independent institutions and civil society as active actors of oversight. In addition, a matrix for assessing the effectiveness of institutional mechanisms has been developed, allowing for the evaluation of their impact on political stability and the reduction of conflict potential.

The findings indicate that effective prevention of conflict recurrence is possible under the condition of forming a network-based institutional governance model that ensures a balance of power, accountability, and the resilience of the political system. The proposed approach expands theoretical perspectives on institutional design in post-conflict societies and may be applied in the practice of public governance reform.