The institution of political opposition in Argentina during the presidency of Javier Milei

Abstract

Purpose: the study aims to comprehensively analyse the institution of political opposition in Argentina under the presidency of Javier Milei (2023–2026), to identify patterns of opposition behaviour, and to assess the impact of opposition fragmentation on the stability of the radical-reformist regime. Methods: the study employs institutional analysis, the case study method, and comparative analysis. The theoretical framework consists of Guillermo O’Donnell’s concept of delegative democracy, Levitsky and Ziblatt’s indicators of authoritarian behaviour, Shanto Iyengar’s concept of affective polarisation, and Lucan Way’s concept of competitive authoritarianism.

Results: a three-segment typology of the opposition space is identified: the Peronist coalition, centrist and moderately right-wing parties, and extra-parliamentary social movements. Key episodes of institutional confrontation are analysed: the parliamentary battle over the Ley Bases, the series of presidential vetoes in 2024–2025, and the provincial elections in Buenos Aires. Milei’s strategy towards the opposition combines systematic delegitimisation, selective coalition-building, and the absorption of social protests through the Bullich Protocol. According to Freedom House (2026), Argentina retains its ‘Free’ status with a score of 85/100, while V-Dem records signs of regression in the liberal dimension.

Conclusions: the structural weakness of the opposition is the key systemic factor underpinning the stability of Milei’s regime. The absence of a unified opposition leader, the ideological exhaustion of the Peronist model, and the resource imbalance following the 2025 midterm elections mutually reinforce this weakness.

Whether the opposition can overcome its fragmentation will determine the competitive character of the 2027 presidential election.