Trump's Second Term and Europe's Strategic Autonomy

Abstract

This article examines the impact of Donald Trump's second presidency on the “price” of American leadership in the Euro-Atlantic space and its implications for the trajectory of European strategic autonomy. Methodologically, the work combines the logic of complex interdependence and soft power with approaches of “weaponized interdependence” and network power, and uses a two-layer model of trust (specific versus general) to track the effects of White House signals on NATO cohesion. The source base comprises official EU and NATO documents, peer-reviewed studies on transatlantic trust, and developments in EU defense and industrial policy. It is shown that the transition to a “coercive” logic (tariffs, export controls, conditional guarantees) does indeed generate one-off concessions, but at the same time increases the political risk of interaction with the US for partners, stimulating a shift away from the dollar and American technology hubs, and the proliferation of minilateral and “club” formats outside Washington. The accumulation of blows to specific trust gradually “sinks” into the plane of general trust, which complicates the mobilization of coalitions and increases the costs of deterrence in crises. Against this backdrop, strategic autonomy in Europe is evolving from a political slogan to a practical “insurance policy”: instead of disengagement, there is an expansion of joint capabilities in ammunition, air defense/missile defense, ISR, logistics, and joint production, embedded in NATO planning and standards. The scientific novelty lies in the integration of networked approaches to power with the operationalization of trust as a strategic resource that can be quickly expended but cannot be quickly restored. The author concludes that the least costly trajectory for both sides of the Atlantic is to make coercion an exception with clear allied safeguards and to systematically rebuild attractiveness; otherwise, order will be maintained, but with greater friction and a weaker US centrality.