Limits of judicial discretion in suspension of proceedings in cases of administrative offences

Abstract

The purpose of the article is to determine the limits of judicial discretion when deciding on the suspension of proceedings in cases concerning administrative offences and to clarify whether, in the absence of an express provision in the Code of Ukraine on Administrative Offences, a court may apply procedural analogy to introduce such a mechanism. The study employs formal-legal, systemic-structural, logical-normative, comparative-legal, and case-law analysis methods. These methods made it possible to examine the provisions of the Code of Ukraine on Administrative Offences, correlate the time limits for case examination with the limitation periods for bringing a person to liability, and distinguish suspension of proceedings from adjournment and other forms of temporary interruption of procedural movement. The study demonstrates that the Code of Ukraine on Administrative Offences does not provide a general and coherent legal framework for suspension of proceedings as an independent institution of administrative-delict procedure. It is shown that contradictory approaches have emerged in legal practice: some courts allow the use of analogy, particularly by reference to criminal procedure, whereas others proceed from the absence of such judicial authority without an explicit legislative provision. The analysis confirms that the use of procedural analogy in this sphere is not a neutral technical solution, since it directly affects the limits of the State’s administrative-punitive function. It is concluded that the limits of judicial discretion in suspending proceedings cannot be justified solely by considerations of procedural expediency. In the absence of an express provision in the Code of Ukraine on Administrative Offences, a court may not independently create a procedural mechanism capable of altering the course of proceedings and affecting the time limits for bringing a person to liability.