Determining the legal status of artificial intelligence in the context of human rights violations

Abstract

The active integration of artificial intelligence (AI) into key spheres of human activity ˗ administrative governance, healthcare, financial services, and the justice system ˗ has created a qualitatively new legal and ethical environment in which the issues of responsibility and human rights protection require urgent doctrinal and normative reconsideration. One of the most pressing problems in this context is the lack of a clearly defined legal status of AI, which complicates the qualification of actions performed by autonomous systems and hinders the implementation of effective accountability mechanisms in cases of human rights violations.

The purpose of this article is to examine theoretical and legislative approaches to determining the legal status of AI in the context of human rights violations, to analyze models of delegated responsibility, and to assess the feasibility of recognizing AI as a special legal subject.

Methods: analysis of scientific literature ˗ to study current developments in the field; generalization and systematization ˗ to present the research results.

Results. The study has shown that contemporary national and international legal systems predominantly regard AI as an object of law, which causes difficulties in defining liability when AI acts autonomously and causes harm. It was found that attempts to adapt existing legal constructs ˗ such as product liability or corporate responsibility ˗ are insufficient to fully resolve the issue of legal accountability for AI-related human rights violations. At the same time, the delegation of responsibility to developers, owners, or operators remains fragmented and inconsistent, especially in cross-border digital contexts. The results of the study confirm the need to develop a hybrid model of responsibility that reflects the complex distribution of functions within AI systems while preserving the foundational principles of human rights law.

The conclusions argue that although the introduction of a whole legal personality for AI is currently premature and controversial, the establishment of a functional legal status - limited to specific contexts and accompanied by strict regulatory oversight—may serve as a transitional mechanism to ensure legal certainty and the protection of individual rights in the age of algorithmic governance.