The axiological nature of state-legal values: between synthetic unity and normative eclecticism
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.19095384Keywords:
legal axiology; state-legal values; rule of law; political legitimacy; legal nihilism; philosophy of law; legal principles; democratic state.Abstract
The article provides a comprehensive theoretical and legal analysis of the axiological nature of state-legal values and their role in shaping the contemporary legal order. The study focuses on the problem of the correlation between the synthetic unity and normative eclecticism of value orientations of law and the state, which becomes particularly relevant in the context of legal system transformations, the development of constitutionalism, and the increasing significance of the rule of law principle. The author substantiates that state-legal values should not be perceived as abstract ideas; rather, they constitute socially recognized goods formed through the interaction between public authority and society and objectified in legal principles, goals, and norms. Special attention is paid to the analysis of axiological approaches within Ukrainian legal doctrine, including the ideas of V. V. Kopieichykov, B. O. Kistiakivskyi, V. P. Horshenev, and O. O. Pylenko, which makes it possible to reveal the historical and theoretical foundations of the formation of state-legal values.
The article examines the correlation between legality and expediency as a key issue of legal axiology, reflecting the tension between the universality of legal norms and the variability of socio-political interests. It explores the social preconditions for the emergence of law as a depersonalized system of regulation aimed at eliminating arbitrariness and ensuring predictability in social relations. Particular attention is devoted to the concept of the probabilistic nature of law, according to which legal regulation is based on forecasting patterns of social behavior rather than on strict determinism. A comparative analysis is conducted with contemporary approaches in Western legal philosophy, including the theories of J. Raz, R. Dworkin, R. Alexy, and J. Habermas, which conceptualize law as a combination of procedural rationality, moral legitimacy, and discursive interaction.
The author argues that the social and personal value of law are interdependent: law simultaneously functions as a mechanism for organizing society and as a guarantee of the realization of individual rights. The paper demonstrates that the devaluation of legal values leads to the spread of legal nihilism, arising from the gap between normative ideals and the practice of law enforcement. It is concluded that preserving the value of law in contemporary conditions depends on the level of public trust, the effectiveness of legal institutions, the development of civil society, and the state’s ability to act within the framework of legal principles.
Downloads
Published
How to Cite
Issue
Section
License
Copyright (c) 2026 Олександр Костянтинович Костюкевич

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.