Russia’s aggression against Georgia and Ukraine: two episodes of a unified imperial reflex

Abstract

The purpose of the article is to identify common patterns in the Russian Federation’s aggression against Georgia (2008) and Ukraine (2014–2022) and to substantiate these conflicts as interconnected stages in the implementation of a single imperial strategy of the Kremlin aimed at revising the international order and restoring control over the post-Soviet space. The study focuses on determining the geopolitical, political-legal, and military-strategic factors that conditioned the escalation of both conflicts. The methodological framework of the research combines comparative-historical, systemic, and security approaches. Comparative and structural-analytical methods are applied to identify common political, legal, and military parameters of Russia’s aggression against Georgia and Ukraine, while the normative-legal method is used to assess violations of international law and international humanitarian law. The empirical basis of the study consists of materials from international organizations (the UN, OSCE, NATO, ECtHR, ICC) and analytical reports of leading research centers. The results. It is established that the wars against Georgia and Ukraine represent phases of a single strategic course pursued by the Kremlin to maintain the post-Soviet space as a “zone of privileged interests.” Persistent triggers of aggression are identified, including the Euro-Atlantic integration of both states, their distancing from Russian integration projects, and the deepening of cooperation with the West. The existence of a reproducible model of pseudo-legal legitimation of aggression is substantiated (passportization, manipulation of the principle of self-determination, humanitarian narratives, and the inversion of the roles of “victim” and “aggressor”). The evolution of Russia’s hybrid instruments is demonstrated-from supporting separatism and conducting localized operations in Georgia to waging a complex war in Ukraine involving regular armed forces. Conclucions. Russia’s aggression against Georgia and Ukraine is interpreted as an integral imperial project aimed at revising the European security order and undermining the norms of international law. The Ukrainian case has become the culmination of this model, in which hybrid methods tested in 2008 were scaled up to the level of full-scale war. Russia’s policy toward both states is characterized by the institutionalization of pseudo-legal mechanisms for legitimizing the use of force and by the use of quasi-state entities as instruments of control. The findings confirm the necessity of viewing the conflicts in Georgia and Ukraine as interconnected stages of a single revisionist strategy of the Kremlin.