International legal regulation of the use of autonomous weapon systems

Abstract

The purpose of the research is to comprehensively analyse the impact of the development of autonomous weapon systems on jus ad bellum and jus in bello, and to assess the robustness or vulnerability of the anthropocentric approach to the use of force in international law.

The relevance of this research on the international legal regulation of the use of autonomous weapon systems is due to the rapid development of artificial intelligence and its integration into the military sphere, which poses fundamentally new challenges for understanding the concept of force in modern international law. The emergence of lethal autonomous weapon systems capable of independently detecting, identifying, and engaging targets without direct human involvement calls into question the traditional anthropocentric understanding of the concepts of “use of force” and “armed attack” enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations.

The central research issue in this article is whether the concept of force in international law – specifically Article 2(4) and Article 51 of the United Nations Charter – retains the anthropocentric requirement of a direct human element in the use of force, or whether the emergence of autonomous weapon systems has rendered this requirement untenable, thus requiring a rethinking of the understanding of the issue of attribution from the perspective of the international legal responsibility of states. At the same time, the research places autonomous weapon systems within the evolutionary context of understanding the concept of force in international law, demonstrating how technological advancements lead to a rethinking of the doctrine without undermining the foundations of the United Nations Charter. Particular attention is paid to the case law of the International Court of Justice, specifically the judgments in Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America) and Corfu Channel (United Kingdom v. Albania), as well as to the principles of international humanitarian law, the positions of the International Committee of the Red Cross, and the peculiarities of regulating autonomous weapon systems under international space law and European Union law.

The scientific novelty of the study lies in its attempt to decouple the concept of the use of force from purely anthropocentric considerations, which have dominated doctrine since the adoption of the Charter of the United Nations, given the rapid development and proliferation of autonomous weapon systems on the battlefield, as well as in a comprehensive analysis of the issues of attribution and state responsibility for the actions of artificial intelligence through the lens of the United Nations Charter, the Draft articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, and other international legal instruments of international humanitarian law, international space law, and European Union law.

The practical significance of the study lies in a fresh perspective on the concept of force in modern international law amid the rapid development of artificial intelligence technologies.